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Abstract 
 
The traditional paradigm of foreign direct investment suggests that FDI is 
undertaken principally to exploit some firm-specific advantage in a foreign 
country which provides a locational advantage to the investor.  However, recent 
theoretical work suggests a model of FDI in which the motivation is not to exploit 
existing technological advantages in a foreign country, but to access such 
technology and transfer it from the host economy to the investing multinational 
corporation via spillover effects.  This paper tests the technology sourcing versus 
technology exploiting hypotheses for a panel of sectoral FDI flows between the 
United States and major OECD nations over a 15 year period. The research 
makes use of Patel and Vega’s (1999) taxonomy of sectors which are likely a 
priori to exhibit technology sourcing and exploiting behaviour respectively.  
While there is evidence that FDI flows into and from the United States are 
attracted to R&D intensive sectors, very little support is found for the technology 
sourcing hypothesis either for inward or outward FDI flows.  The results suggest 
that, in aggregate, firm-specific ‘ownership’ effects remain powerful 
determinants of FDI flows. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The role of technology in foreign direct investment (FDI) is a source of some 
ambiguity.  Within the dominant ‘eclectic paradigm’ (Dunning, 1988) the role of 
technology seems clear enough. The paradigm suggests that where a company has 
some ‘ownership’ (i.e. competitive) advantage over its rivals, and where for reasons 
of property rights protection licensing is unsafe, a company will set up production 
facilities in a foreign country through FDI, as long as there are specific advantages in 
the host country which make FDI preferable to exporting. Since much of the 
discussion of ownership advantages is couched in terms of technology and/or 
management expertise, there is therefore a strong a priori assumption that FDI will 
be an important method by which technology is transferred internationally from 
home to host countries.  
 
However, recent theoretical work has given renewed impetus to something long 
recognised in the literature, that a possible motive for FDI is not to exploit 
proprietary technology, but to access it: thus technology sourcing may be the motive 
for FDI. For example, Fosfuri and Motta (1999) question the need for firm-specific 
advantages to give rise to multinational activity, and provide a formal model of FDI 
in which the motivation is not to exploit existing technological advantages in a 
foreign country, but to access such technology and transfer it from the host economy 
to the investing multinational corporation via spillover effects.  This possibility has 
had some policy influence in the United States and Europe, with concerns that the 
technological base of these economies may be at risk through the technology 
sourcing activities of Japanese and US corporations respectively (Kogut and Chang 
1991; Neven and Siotis 1996) 
 
The recent literature on the internationalization of R&D suggests that this concern 
may be well placed (Cantwell, 1995; Cantwell and Janne 1999; Kuemmerle, 1999a, 
1999b; Patel and Vega, 1999).  This literature stresses a range of reasons for FDI in 
R&D, much of which is concerned with the relative technological strengths of the 
capital exporting (i.e. ‘home’) firm or country versus that of the host.  The evidence 
suggests that corporations are increasingly moving their R&D facilities abroad, and 
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that this is being done as part of a strategic move away from merely adapting ‘core’ 
technology to a foreign market towards a much more central role in product 
innovation and development.  In addition, the literature suggests that there is a 
growing willingness to locate such facilities close to leading centres of research and 
innovation specifically with a view to absorbing learning spillovers from 
geographical proximity to such sites (Pearce, 1999; Niosi, 1999; Serapio and Dalton, 
1999). 
 
This paper adds to the debate by performing a panel analysis of manufacturing FDI 
flows between the United States and its major recipient/investing countries which not 
only examines the technology sourcing versus technology exploitation hypotheses for 
the sample overall, but does so separately for those sectors and countries which the 
conceptual literature identifies as being most likely to exhibit these contrasting forms 
of investing behaviour (Patel and Vega, 1999).  The next section provides an 
overview of the literature on technology sourcing and related issues.  This is followed 
by the development of the empirical model, and a discussion of the results for both 
outward and inward FDI between the United States and seven major OECD 
countries.  The paper concludes that, while there is evidence that FDI tends to be 
attracted to research-intensive sectors, there is relatively little support for the 
technology sourcing hypothesis for FDI flows between the United States and other 
major OECD countries. 
 
2.   Evidence on Technology Sourcing 
 
As noted by Neven and Siotis (1996), there has been considerable concern by some 
countries that domestic technology can be “tapped into” by foreign investors. This 
can be the case when foreign firms, operating in home countries where the 
technological base is relatively weak in a chosen sector, choose to invest in leading 
centres of research and development excellence, for example by developing 
collaborations between local R&D laboratories and universities. Much of the work in 
this area has therefore tended to concentrate on the internationalisation of R&D and 
related activities.  
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Kuemmerle (1999a) distinguishes between ‘home-base exploiting’ (HBE) FDI and 
‘home-base augmenting’ (HBA) FDI.  The former is undertaken in order to exploit 
firm-specific advantages abroad, while the latter is FDI undertaken to access unique 
resources and capture externalities created locally. His subsequent empirical work 
(Kuemmerle 1999b) finds evidence that that HBE and HBA research sites are subject 
to different locational determinants. Patel and Vega (1999) push this conceptual 
model further.  They suggest a ‘revealed technological advantage’ (RTA) index 
analogous to indices of revealed comparative advantage in trade, and suggests four 
categories of international technological activity: 
 
Type 1: Home RTA<1 and Host RTA>1; weak home, strong host i.e. true 
technological sourcing. 
Type 2: Home RTA>1 and Host RTA<1; strong home, weak host i.e. closest to the 
traditional ownership advantage idea from the Eclectic Paradigm and similar to 
Kuemmerle’s ‘home-base exploiting’ (HBE). 
Type 3: Home RTA>1 and Host RTA>1; strong home and host i.e. roughly 
Kuemmerle’s ‘home-base augmenting’ (HBA) coupled with ‘strategic asset seeking 
behaviour’ (Dunning and Narula 1995). 
Type 4: Home RTA<1 and Host RTA<1; both home and host weak; result of e.g. 
mergers where the FDI motive is unrelated to technology. 
 
Although there has been no direct testing of these categories, there is considerable 
survey-based evidence on technology sourcing as a motive for internationalising 
R&D. Using survey evidence for Swedish chemical and engineering industries, 
Håkanson and Nobel (1993) find relatively limited evidence of technology sourcing; 
of a total of 172 Swedish research laboratories set up abroad, only 13 were set up 
with the sole intention of sourcing foreign technology. However, Gassmann and von 
Zedtwitz (1999) find strong evidence that when foreign technology development 
becomes too significant to ignore companies establish ‘listening posts’ in areas of 
technological expertise around the World.  In a study of patent citations in the US 
semiconductor industry, Almeida (1996) finds that foreign subsidiaries make more 
use of sector and geographically specific knowledge than do domestic firms, and 
concludes that Korean and European subsidiaries in particular use ‘knowledge 
sourcing’ from US firms to upgrade their technological ability in areas in which they 
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are relatively weak.  An analysis of foreign R&D direct investment in the United 
States by Serapio and Dalton (1999) concludes that the nature of such investment is 
changing, with more emphasis on gaining direct access to American technology and 
expertise, especially in biotechnology and electronics.  They also conclude that 
foreign firms are increasingly investing in R&D sites in the United States to access 
technologies which are complementary to those of the investing firms.  Pearce (1999) 
comes to broadly similar conclusions from a survey of multinational corporations’ 
production and laboratory facilities in the UK. Companies which previously exerted 
rather tight control over their R&D sites are now granting more autonomy and 
empowerment to R&D laboratories situated abroad. It appears that, whereas in the 
1970s and early 1980s organisations saw establishing R&D outlets abroad as little 
more than adapting products to local markets as hypothesised by the product life 
cycle hypothesis, during the 1990s organisations began to take a more decentralised 
approach to R&D (Niosi 1999). The emphasis tends to be on an integrated strategy 
with co-ordination of R&D resources across national boundaries. 
 
There is evidence, however, that investment abroad is not merely restricted to firms 
operating in areas of domestic weakness. For example, Cantwell and Janne (1999) 
examine European firm patents granted in the United States from 1969 to 1995 and 
find evidence that leading multinationals operating in major European centres in their 
own activity tend to carry out technological activity abroad which is relatively 
differentiated from their domestic technological strengths. Conversely, firms from 
lower order centres tend to locate research in their own domestic fields of 
technological strength, extending the depth of their established lines of activity in the 
most important centre in the locational hierarchy of their industry.  This work, and 
that of Serapio and Dalton (1999) reviewed above, suggests that it is mistaken to 
imagine that ‘technology sourcing’ always involves technologically weak countries 
accessing the technology of those which are technologically strong; technology 
sourcing may occur where both parties are absolutely strong in technology, but where 
one is rather stronger than the other i.e. the ‘Type 3’ investment of Patel and Vega 
(1999).  Indirect support for this contention comes from Chen and Chen’s (1998) 
work on network linkages.  They find that Taiwanese firms use strategic network 
connections to gain access to strategic assets in foreign countries, especially the 
United States.  This strategic linkage approach explicitly views FDI as an attempt to 
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acquire knowledge that reinforces the strengths of the investor, or complements the 
investor’s weaknesses. 
 
Recent research on domestic R&D appears to lend some indirect support for the 
technology sourcing hypothesis. Driffield and Munday (2000) study inward 
investment into the United Kingdom between 1984 and 1992, and find evidence that 
R&D intensity in the relevant UK sector has a significantly positive effect on inward 
FDI.  Intriguingly, Driffield and Munday explain this as evidence of the importance 
of  proprietary knowledge as a source of ownership advantage, rather than as 
evidence of technology sourcing. Vannoni (1999) examines numbers of Italian firm 
entries and exits into the EU and finds that R&D expenditures in host country 
industries have a significant impact on Italian firm entry abroad. Barriers to entry 
with regards to public procurement policies, distance from Italy, and unit labour costs 
in host countries were also found to be important. 
  
Only a handful of studies have attempted direct econometric analysis on the specific 
issue of technology sourcing. Kogut and Chang (1991) examine the entry of Japanese 
firms into specific US sectors from 1976 to 1987, and use an R&D difference 
variable in an attempt to account for technology sourcing as a potential motive for 
Japanese entry into US markets. The intuition is that should the US sector in question 
experience a higher R&D intensity relative to the Japanese sector, then this would 
encourage Japanese firms who wish to source US technology to set up in the United 
States1. The authors found that US R&D intensities and innovation frequencies were 
positively associated with Japanese entry, but the coefficients for these variables 
were insignificant. Barriers to entry and especially the tariff-jumping motive were 
found to be more important, providing further evidence that Japanese investment 
abroad tends to be particularly sensitive to trade barriers. Only in the case of joint 
ventures did Kogut and Chang find evidence that US-Japanese R&D differentials 
encouraged inward investment. In a similar vein Neven and Siotis (1996) examined 
both Japanese and US investment into the EC together with intra EC FDI flows. 
Using Kogut and Chang’s R&D difference variable to examine the possibility of 
technological sourcing, Neven and Siotis examine actual FDI flows rather than the 
propensity for foreign entry. Although there is some evidence that technology 
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sourcing is a consideration for both Japanese and US firms, the evidence tends to be 
rather weak, with the R&D differential variables having coefficients significant only 
at the 10% level. Stronger evidence was found that US investments into the EC 
tended to be more motivated by tariff jumping considerations together with growth in 
European markets.  
 
Finally, using similar R&D sum and differential measures to Kogut and Chang and to 
Neven and Siotis, Beladi et al (1999) find no evidence of technology sourcing by 
major investing countries into the United States over the periods 1980-86 and 1987-
93, and conclude that traditional firm-specific advantages are more likely to be the 
motivation for FDI.  However, like the previous studies, Beladi et al do find evidence 
that FDI is more likely to occur in industries where overall R&D expenditures are 
high.  The  message from these empirical studies appears to be that domestic 
investment in R&D can indeed be associated with relatively high levels of FDI, but 
that there is relatively weak (at best) evidence for outright technology sourcing by 
inward investing firms. 
 
This suggests something of a dichotomy between two strands of the literature.  On 
the one hand, the literature on globalization of R&D and network linkages appears to 
provide evidence, albeit of an anecdotal and survey nature, of increasing 
internationalization of research related FDI, at least partly motivated by a desire to 
keep up with or access leading edge technologies internationally.  On the other hand, 
the econometric evidence on foreign entry and overall FDI flows suggests at best 
weak evidence for the existence of technology sourcing on a systematic scale.  
However, it may not be surprising that the technology sourcing motive fails to show 
strongly in previous analysis of aggregate FDI flows, as this effect would tend to be 
‘washed out’ by the myriad other influences on overall FDI.  This suggests that there 
is merit in examining not simply aggregate FDI flows, but in concentrating the 
analysis on those sectors and countries where, conceptually, there are grounds for 
believing the technology sourcing and technology exploiting effects are most likely 
to be clearly differentiated. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
1  R&D intensity is measured as a ratio of total R&D expenditures divided by sales 
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The present research attempts to do this by performing a panel analysis of 
manufacturing FDI flows between the United States and its major recipient/investing 
countries which not only examines the technology sourcing hypothesis for the sample 
overall, but does so separately for the ‘Types’ of investment identified in the 
classification of  Patel and Vega (1999).  This serves two purposes. First, it offers 
further evidence on the existence or otherwise of technology-sourcing FDI into and 
out of the world’s principal investing and recipient nation for a longer and more 
recent time period than previous research; previous studies have examined 
technology sourcing into or from the United States, but not both. Secondly, it permits 
an empirical test of the categories suggested by Patel and Vega: a priori one would 
expect to find the strongest evidence of technology sourcing in their Type 1 category 
(technologically weak home country and strong host country) and weaker evidence of 
technology sourcing in the other categories, with the strongest evidence for the 
technology exploiting hypothesis being found in the Type 2 category (technologically 
strong home country and relatively weak host).   
 
3.  Empirical Model 
 
Empirical testing of the technology sourcing hypothesis should be placed within a 
plausible model of FDI.  One model, which has been widely tested, suggests that the 
optimal stock of foreign capital for any firm (K*) depends principally on the scale of 
demand in the recipient country (the ‘market size’ hypothesis), and on relative factor 
costs in the capital exporting and recipient countries, i.e.  
 
   K* = K[Xf, (cf - cd)]     (1) 
 
where Xf is demand in the host (‘foreign’) country and cf - cd is the unit cost 
differential between production in the host and home (‘domestic’) country. However, 
in any given period, actual and desired foreign capital stocks are unlikely to be equal 
as a result of adjustment costs and operating lags, such as delays in finding suitable 
overseas investments, delivery lags etc. (Barrell and Pain, 1996).  Flows of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) will therefore be a lagged function of the difference between 
actual and desired capital stocks in previous periods, in addition to demand and factor 
cost issues. This can be considered as a partial adjustment model of the form: 
 8
 
   It = (K*t - Kt-1) + Kt-1      (2) 
 
where It is the flow of FDI in year t, Kt-1 is the lagged value of actual foreign capital 
stock, and  is a distributed lag function.  This can be rewritten: 
 
    It =  K*t + ( - )Kt-1    (3) 
 
Thus the flow of FDI depends both on the determinants of the optimal capital stock 
derived from equation (1), and on the lagged value of actual foreign capital stock 
 
Empirical testing takes the general form: 
 
   It = 0 + 1Xt + 2(cf - cd)t + 3Kt-1 + t   (4) 
 
Specifications of this sort have been empirically tested for direct investment flows 
into the United Kingdom (Pain, 1993), South East Asia (Lucas, 1993), Spain (Bajo-
Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero, 1994), Mexico (Love and Lage-Hidalgo, 2000) and for 
outward direct investment from the United States (Barrell and Pain, 1996).  In the 
estimations discussed below, an augmented version of this basic model is tested on 
panel data to distinguish between the technology sourcing and technology exploiting 
hypotheses. 
 
4.  Data 
 
The data involve a panel of sectoral level FDI flows and their determinants over the 
period 1981-95 both from the United States to its major recipient countries, and from 
these countries into the United States. This permits testing of the technology sourcing 
and technology exploiting hypotheses both from and to the United States.  For 
outward FDI (i.e. investment flows from the United States) consistent data are 
available at the NACE/ISIC 2-digit level for seven manufacturing sectors (food, 
drink and tobacco; chemicals; metal products; non-electrical equipment; electrical 
and electronic goods; transport equipment; and other manufacturing) for seven major 
recipient countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Japan and UK).  
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For inward FDI flows (i.e. investment flows into the United States) the same seven 
major investing countries are included in the panel data for five sectors (food and 
kindred products; chemicals; primary and fabricated metals; machinery; and other 
manufacturing).  These countries are among the major FDI investing and recipient 
economies, collectively accounting for 82% of direct investment outflows and 67% 
of  inflows within the OECD during the 1990s (Table 1).  
 
The dependent variable is FDIit, the flow of direct investment from home to host 
country sector per time period, expressed  per unit of output in the host country 
sector.  Expressing the dependent variable in this way removes the need for a 
separate independent variable to proxy the host’s market size, and is consistent with 
previous research in the area (Neven and Siotis 1996; Beladi et al 1999).  FDIit 
includes equity capital, reinvested earnings and debt flows between parent and 
affiliates, which are the three elements of FDI agreed for reporting in the IMF’s 
Balance of Payments Yearbook (Barrell and Pain 1997, p. 64). Unit cost differentials 
are proxied by the real unit labour cost differential between host and home country 
sectors (ULCDIFit)2. Kit-1 is the real value of FDI stock in the host country’s sector 
from the relevant home country, lagged one year. 
 
The specification suggested by equation (4) concentrates exclusively on the 
‘locational’ determinants of FDI flows. To test for the technology sourcing and firm-
specific ‘ownership’ effects  several extensions are made to the basic model.  R&D 
intensity (RDIit), defined as R&D expenditure divided by output in the host and home 
countries sectors, is used to differentiate between the technology sourcing and 
technology exploiting incentives for FDI: a positive association between host country 
R&D intensity and FDI flows suggests technology sourcing as a motive, while a 
positive association between home country R&D intensity and FDI flows points to 
the predominance of technology exploiting motive. However, Kogut and Chang 
(1991), Neven and Siotis (1996) and Beladi et al (1999) observe that sectoral R&D 
intensities across countries tend to be highly correlated, and instead employ the sum 
and difference of R&D intensities between host and home countries which tend to 
                                                     
2  Cost of capital differentials are not include in the estimation because they tend to display little variation 
by sector and because the empirical evidence on FDI flows suggests they tend to have an insignificant 
effect, unlike relative unit labour costs (Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero 1994; Love and Lage-Hidalgo, 
2000). 
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show much lower correlation3.  Therefore RDSUMit controls for the effect of 
technology as a transferable asset in FDI, while RDDIFit (host minus home) tests for 
the motivational influence: a positive coefficient on RDDIF suggests the technology 
sourcing motive, while a negative coefficient indicates technology exploitation. 
Measures are also included to allow for the possible impact on FDI of tariff and non-
tariff barriers at the industry level, to account for the possible ‘tariff-jumping’ motive 
and to allow for the move towards increased reliance on non-tariff trade bariers 
during the period in question. TARi is the production-weighted average of ad valorem 
tariff rates per sector in the host country, and NTBi is a frequency ratio indicating the 
percentage of national tariff lines which are affected by major non-tariff barriers such 
as quotas and voluntary export restraints.  Full details of the data sources can be 
found in the data appendix. 
 
The estimating equation is thus: 
 
FDIit = 0 + 1RDSUMit + 2RDDIFit + 3ULCDIFit +  4TARit  + 4NTBit  
   + 4Kit-1 + it       (5) 
 
where it = i + t + it.  This is the standard ‘random effects’ model outlined in 
Baltagi (1995).4 
 
5.  Results 
a)  Outward FDI 
 
The results of panel data estimation for outward US direct investment to the seven 
recipient countries are considered first. The procedure involves estimating equation 
(5) first for overall FDI flows from the United States, and then separately for the 
different investment ‘Types’ identified in the Patel and Vega taxonomy. 
 
For the overall estimation, missing data reduced the 735 possible observations to 704 
actual observations. These results are given in Table 2. Column (a) shows the OLS 
                                                     
3 This is true also of  the present data set. For example, in the inward FDI sample the correlation coefficient 
between US and foreign RDI is 0.46, while that between RDSUM and RDDIF is 0.24. 
4 The restriction of fixed versus random effects is formally tested in the results section below. 
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regression results, which simply pools together all observations. The OLS results 
show highly significant coefficients for RDSUM and RDDIF, apparently indicating 
that FDI outflows from the United States are more likely in R&D intensive sectors, 
and that technology sourcing is an important motivation for these flows.  However, 
these results are highly misleading as they fail to account for any sector and time 
effects present in the panel data. Full panel estimation indicated that a one-way fixed 
effects model was appropriate,5 as indicated by the Hausman test results in Table 2.  
The fixed-effects results (column b) indicate that the apparent technology-sourcing 
effect is removed once the influence of country/sector fixed effects are properly 
allowed for; the only remaining variable with a significant coefficient is Kt-1, which 
has the predicted sign.  All other variables have highly insignificant coefficients.  The 
model has an adjusted R2 of 0.23.  The coefficients on TAR and NTB were 
insignificant for these and all other estimations, and are dropped from the subsequent 
analysis. 
 
The coefficients on the fixed effects dummy variables (not shown) suggest that these 
are essentially country rather than sectoral effects.  To illustrate the importance of 
these country effects, an estimation was carried out which stratifies the panel only by 
sector and includes country dummies (column c).   In this case a Hausman test 
indicated that a random effects model was appropriate6.  In this estimation RDSUM 
again has a significantly positive coefficient, but that on RDDIF is negative but 
insignificant.  ULCDIF has the anticipated negative coefficient which is significant at 
5%, and the country dummies for Canada, the Netherlands and the UK have 
statistically positive coefficients.  Thus for overall outward FDI flows form the 
United States, while there is evidence that FDI does tend to flow between relatively 
R&D intensive sectors, there is little support for outright technology sourcing. 
 
As suggested earlier, however, technology sourcing may be an activity restricted to 
particular sectors or countries, and its effects may thus be masked in consideration of 
overall sectoral FDI flows. The next stage is therefore to test whether the 
hypothetical categories developed by Patel and Vega (1999) have any influence on 
the technology sourcing effect. As indicated in the literature review, Patel and Vega 
                                                     
5 This suggests a lack of significant time period effects for the outward FDI flows. 
6 The results of the fixed-effects version were not qualitatively different. 
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suggest a ‘revealed technological advantage’ (RTA) index analogous to indices of 
revealed comparative advantage in trade7, defined here as country i's proportion of 
OECD R&D expenditure in sector j divided by country i’s proportion of total OECD 
R&D expenditure.  Thus where OECD takes the subscript o:  
 
 
In the Patel and Vega taxonomy, ‘Type 1’ investment is where RTAhome<1 and 
RTAhost>1 i.e. the home country is technologically weak and the host technologically 
strong.  This is a priori the most likely scenario for technology sourcing to occur, and 
accounts for 43% of the (outward) observations in the panel.  ‘Type 2’ investment 
occurs where the home is technologically strong and the host relatively weak, closer 
to the traditional idea of a strong multinational firm exploiting its technology abroad  
(29% of the observations in the outward panel). ‘Type 3’ investment is where both 
home and host are relatively technologically strong (8% of the outward panel), and 
‘Type 4’ where both home and host country are relatively weak (20% of the outward 
panel). 
 
Patel and Vega develop this principally as a taxonomy with no empirical testing as to 
effects on FDI flows. Clearly this approach puts a lot of stress on the arbitrary cut-off 
point of unity for the indices.  Thus a home country with an RTA of 1.01 investing in 
a host with an RTA of 5 would be regarded as engaging in Type 3 ‘home-base 
augmenting’ investment (because both values are above unity) despite the massively 
greater technological intensity of the host economy  But it is possible that technology 
sourcing could be the motive here because of the substantial differences in relative 
‘technological advantage’.  This suggests that, in interpreting probable motives for 
FDI, empirical research has to take account not merely of the RTA values, but of the 
differences in technological intensities between home and host economies. This is, of 
                                                     
7 This type of index was developed initially by Soete (1987) and used subsequently  by Cantwell (1989). 
Almeida (1996) also makes use of a similar index.  Soete’s RTA index uses patents rather than R&D 
expenditure, and is thus an output rather than an input measure.  However, Soete (1987) also shows that  
input and output measures of technological activity are strongly correlated. 
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course, the role played by the RDDIF variable, and shows the advantage of 
combining the econometric analysis of the technology sourcing literature with the 
taxonomy of Patel and Vega.8  For present purposes, the principal concern is with the 
possible different motivational implications of Type 1 and Type 2 investment, where 
the technology sourcing and technology exploiting motives should be most clearly 
distinguished.  Separate panel estimations of equation (5) are therefore undertaken 
for observations falling into these two categories. 
 
Columns (d) and (e) respectively of Table 2 show the results for these two types.  In 
neither case is there any support for the technology sourcing hypothesis.  The fixed-
effects results for Type 1 observations (column d) show all variables with 
coefficients of the expected  sign, but all insignificant: only the country/sector fixed 
effects show any significant coefficients (not shown).  In the case of Type 2 
investment (column e), the R&D variables have highly insignificant coefficients; 
ULCDIF and Kt-1 have significant coefficients, but the former has a counterintuitive 
sign.  Ideally, a separate estimation should also be carried out for Type 3 
observations in order to test whether, for example, technological sourcing is still a 
viable motive even for where both home and host are relatively technologically 
strong.  However, the limited number of observations in this category (58) precludes 
this in a panel which includes 49 fixed-effects dummy variables. 
 
Overall, these results suggest there is little support for the technology sourcing 
hypothesis with respect to FDI flows between the United States and its major 
recipient nations, even for those sectors in which such an effect might be most likely.  
This contrasts with the results of  Neven and Siotis (1996) who performed a similar 
analysis9 on FDI flows between the United States and four EU countries over the 
period 1984-89 and found some (weak) evidence to support the technology sourcing 
hypothesis. The difference between the present results and those of Neven and Siotis 
may be partly due to the longer time period and more extensive group of countries 
which  employed here, but is more probably a result of the use of full panel 
                                                     
8 The variables used to measure R&D intensity (RDIit) and revealed technological advantage (RTAit) are 
not highly correlated.  For the outward FDI sample, the correlation coefficients between RDIit and RTAit 
are 0.123 for the host countries and 0.368 for the United States, while for the inward FDI sample the 
equivalent correlation coefficients are 0.076 for the home countries and 0.385 for the United States. 
9 However, Neven and Siotis did not attempt to break their sample into Type 1 and Type 2 categories. 
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estimation which Neven and Siotis were unable to undertake.  In addition, Neven and 
Siotis did not allow for the unit labour cost or lagged stock effects included in the 
present model.  
 
b)  Inward FDI 
 
The next stage is to test for the existence of technology sourcing in FDI into the 
United States from the same seven major investing countries.  In most cases a two-
way panel estimation was conducted on inward FDI flows, because of the existence 
of significant time period effects10.  With one exception, fixed effects estimation was 
found to be appropriate. Table 3 shows the results of the basic model on 473 
available observations11.  As with the outward FDI estimations, the tariff and non-
tariff barrier variables consistently had insignificant coefficients and were dropped 
from the analysis.  Table 3 shows two versions of this inward model; in the first, the 
unit cost differential is as before (column a), and the alternative is RULCit, a measure 
of the home countries’ unit labour costs relative to the OECD sectoral average 
(column b).  The results are somewhat stronger than for the outward FDI estimation.  
The positive and significant coefficients on RDSUM suggest that R&D intensive 
sectors are more likely to attract inward investment into the United States.  However, 
in both estimations the coefficient on RDDIF is negative, and in one estimation it is 
significant at the 10% level, suggesting that for inward FDI flows into these US 
sectors, the technology exploiting motive predominates.  ULCDIF/RULC and  Kt-1 
have coefficients with the correct sign, but are statistically insignificant.  The models 
have an adjusted R2 of 0.37, considerably higher than for the outward FDI 
estimations. 
 
As with the outward estimations, separate panel estimations can be performed for 
Type 1 and Type 2 investments12.  The Type 1 estimation, which accounts for 20% of 
the total observations, shows the first suggestion of support for the technology 
souring hypothesis, (Table 2 column c).  Both RDSUM and RDDIF have 
                                                     
10 These relate mainly to the period 1987-89 when there was an upsurge in inward FDI to the United States. 
The only exception to this was the model for Type 1 inward investment, which showed no evidence of time 
effects. 
11 Missing data reduced the observations from a possible 525. 
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significantly positive coefficients, although ULCDIF remains insignificant.  
However, this is a less pervasive effect than it might first appear.  For inward 
investment, Type 1 observations are restricted to the ‘other manufacturing’ sector, a 
catchall which includes a number of relatively low-technology industries13. The 
results for Type 2 investment (column d) shows broadly what would be expected 
from Patel and Vega’s taxonomy.  The significantly positive coefficient on RDSUM 
continues to indicate that FDI flows are attracted to relatively high R&D sectors, 
while the negative (but marginally insignificant) coefficient on RDDIF is suggestive 
of a technology exploiting rather than technology sourcing motive, in line with the 
expected outcome for this category of investment.  ULCDIF and Kt-1 have 
coefficients with the anticipated signs, the latter statistically significant. 
 
These results are very much in keeping with those of Beladi et al (1999) who found 
strong and consistent evidence that direct investment into the United states is 
attracted to relatively R&D intensive manufacturing sectors: the consistently 
significant and positive coefficients on RDSUM support this conclusion.  And, like 
Beladi et al, I  find no support for the technology sourcing hypothesis on overall FDI 
into the United States, and some support for the hypothesis that companies investing 
in the United States do so to exploit their existing technology, rather than access US 
technology. However, there is some hint of technology sourcing in the ‘other 
manufacturing’ sector in which the United States has a consistent revealed 
technological advantage over its other OECD counterparts. 
 
 
 
6.   Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this paper is to add to the developing literature on technology 
sourcing versus technology exploitation as a motivation for FDI.  Unlike previous 
research I have been able to undertake panel analysis of manufacturing FDI flows in 
both directions between the United States and its major investing/recipient nations.  
                                                                                                                                          
12 As with the outward FDI data, the low number of Type 3 observations (10) precluded separate estimation 
for this category. 
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In addition, I performed separate estimations for clusters of FDI observations which 
the conceptual literature suggests are most likely to exhibit different technology-
related investing behaviour.  As far as I am aware, this is the first empirical use of 
Patel and Vega’s (1999) taxonomy. 
 
In common with much of the previous literature, there is consistent evidence that FDI 
into the United States is attracted to relatively R&D-intensive sectors: this effect is 
also present, but less pronounced, for  FDI flows from the United States.  However, 
the econometric analysis provides very little support for the technology sourcing 
hypothesis.  There is no evidence of technology sourcing in outward US direct 
investment, even in the sectors in which the United States has a relative technological 
disadvantage compared to the recipient countries.  In the case of inward FDI this 
result is even more pronounced.  Not only is there almost no support for technology 
sourcing, but the evidence points towards technology exploitation by foreign 
multinationals operating in the United States:  the possible exception to this is the 
‘other manufacturing’ sector, in which the United States has a consistent revealed 
technological advantage with the relevant investing nations, and where there is a hint 
of a technology sourcing effect. 
 
There is little in these results to support the concerns expressed in Kogut and Chang 
(1991) and Neven and Siotis (1996) about the possibility of widespread technology 
sourcing by foreign investors among  OECD countries. The results indicate that 
simply because R&D intensive sectors attract a great deal of direct investment, this 
does not necessarily indicate that this investment is being undertaken to access the 
technology of foreign hosts. Indeed, these results, like those of Beladi et al (1999), 
suggest that the technological ‘ownership’ advantage is still a powerful determinant 
of FDI flows, even in relatively R&D intensive sectors.  The fact that there is little 
evidence for technology sourcing in FDI into the United States is perhaps the most 
striking finding.  This may be connected to the relatively high proportion of federally 
funded R&D among the research-intensive sectors of the United States.  Incoming 
foreign companies may take the opinion that there is little scope for spillover learning 
effects from such R&D, and the sectors in which there is some support for the 
                                                                                                                                          
13 For inward investment this category includes textiles; paper, printing and publishing; rubber and plastics; 
non-metallic mineral products; and transportation equipment. 
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technology sourcing hypothesis tend to be relatively non-research intensive and 
lacking in federally funded R&D.  More prosaically, however, this finding may 
simply reflect the fact that the size of the American economy is an attractive 
motivational influence for foreign investors, regardless of any technological 
advantage to be gained from locating in the United States.  
 
I recognise, however, that these findings do not suggest that individual acts of 
technology sourcing never occur.  Clearly estimation of this kind can do no more 
than look for patterns in the overall level of FDI, and can only be a complement to 
detailed survey-based analysis of the behaviour of multinational enterprises.  For the 
same reason the present findings need not be viewed as incompatible with the 
literature on the internationalization of R&D and the establishing of  facilities 
designed in part to absorb spillovers through proximity to leading edge technological 
establishments. Such behaviour could conceivably be the precursor to more 
widespread subsequent FDI flows, but the results detailed above suggest that direct 
investment of this type is still a relatively minor motivational element within overall 
FDI flows. 
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Data Appendix 
 
Variable Definition Source 
   
FDI Flows of direct investment from/to the 
United States from the relevant countries, 
divided by host country sectoral output.  
FDI flows comprise equity capital + 
reinvested earnings + intercompany debt 
flows. 
US Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. 
   
RDI R&D intensity i.e. R&D expenditure 
divided by output. 
OECD ANBERD/ANRSE 
database (R&D expenditure) 
and OECD STAN database 
(production) 
   
RDSUM Sum of RDI for host and home countries. As above 
   
RDDIF Difference between RDI for host and home 
countries (host minus home). 
As above 
   
RTA Index of revealed technological advantage 
i.e. country i's proportion of OECD R&D 
expenditure in sector j divided by country 
i’s proportion of total OECD R&D 
expenditure. 
OECD ANBERD/ANRSE 
database 
   
ULCDIF Difference between unit labour costs for 
host and home countries (host minus 
home). 
OECD 
   
RULC Relative unit labour costs (relative to 
OECD sectoral average) 
OECD Main Industrial 
Indicators database 
   
TAR Production-weighted average of ad 
valorem tariff rates per sector in the host 
country. 
OECD Indicators of Tariff and 
Non-Tariff Barriers 
   
NTB Frequency ratio indicating the percentage 
of national tariff lines which are affected by 
major non-tariff barriers such as quotas and 
voluntary export restraints. 
OECD Indicators of Tariff and 
Non-Tariff Barriers 
   
Kt-1 Real stock of FDI, lagged one year. US Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 
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Inflows  Outflows  
United States 605 052 United States 662 652 
United Kingdom 240 513 United Kingdom 364 733 
France 178 323 Germany 318 640 
Belgium-Luxembourg 105 859 France 257 407 
Netherlands 101 028 Japan 227 984 
Spain 84 039 Netherlands 180 864 
Mexico 68 576 Canada 93 565 
Sweden 67 798 Switzerland 83 657 
Canada 66 888 Sweden 80 010 
Germany 60 260 Belgium- Luxembourg 79 540 
Australia 55 603 Italy 71 624 
Italy 31 278 Spain 50 984 
Greece 26 823 Finland 37 736 
Denmark 24 456 Australia 27 636 
Poland 22 909 Korea 24 931 
Switzerland 22 073 Denmark 24 657 
Norway 19 709 Norway 22 730 
New Zealand 19 523 Austria 15 516 
Austria 18 875 Portugal 8 029 
Finland 18 794 New Zealand 4 079 
Hungary 17 193 Turkey 1 442 
Portugal 16 091 Hungary 1 012 
Korea 15 582 Czech Republic   500 
Japan 13 631 Poland   363 
OECD 1 928 899 OECD 2 640 600 
 
Table 1: Cumulative FDI flows involving OECD countries, 1990-1998 ($ million) 
Source:  Financial Market Trends, OECD, June 1999  
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Table 2.   Panel Regression Analysis: Outward FDI 
      
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
      
Constant 1.139 --- -0.889 --- 8.545** 
 (0.803)  (1.163)  (4.320) 
RDSUM 25.395*** 15.898 22.462** 27.056 -27.049 
 (5.692) (17.272) (9.822) (20.156) (47.891) 
RDDIF 35.655*** -7.585 9.171 3.346 28.316 
 (8.315) (23.125) (12.453) (27.137) (59.440) 
ULCDIF 2.131*** -1.050 -2.506** -3.809 6.944* 
 (0.811) (1.731) (1.216) (2.569) (4.074) 
Kt-1 (10-3) 0.582*** -0.629** -0.093 -0.133 -1.131** 
 (0.145) (0.317) (0.198) (0.419) (0.692) 
TAR -0.015 -0.101 --- --- --- 
 (0.015) (0.208)    
NTB -0.059 -0.043 --- --- --- 
 (0.045) (0.129)    
Canada --- --- 8.720*** --- --- 
   (1.305)   
France --- --- 0.314 --- --- 
   (0.784)   
Germany --- --- 0.609 --- --- 
   (0.851)   
Italy --- --- 0.214 --- --- 
   (0.778)   
Netherlands --- --- 1.791** --- --- 
   (0.798)   
UK --- --- 4.567*** --- --- 
   (1.107)   
Adjusted R2 0.125 0.232 0.209 0.265 0.144 
No. Observations 704 704 704 301 205 
Fixed vs. random 
effects: 2[d.f.]  
--- 24.34  
(0.00) [6df] 
  1.69 
(0.99)[10df] 
14.78 
(0.00)[4 df] 
  7.72 
(0.10) [4df] 
Model OLS Fixed 
effects 
Random 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Random 
effects 
      
 
Standard errors in parentheses.  Significant at *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% on a two-tailed t-test. 
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Table 3.   Panel Regression Analysis: Inward FDI 
    
 (a)    (b)   (c)   (d) 
    
Constant -0.051 -0.622 -3.086** -0.898 
 (0.671) (1.532) (1.357) (1.219) 
RDSUM 33.091*** 30.248*** 50.935* 74.777*** 
 (11.753) (11.525) (26.879) (23.315) 
RDDIF -22.697 -28.334*  46.196* -46.310 
 (17.254) (16.681) (25.390) (30.793) 
ULCDIF -1.417 --- -0.434 -1.928 
 (1.045)  (0.757) (1.936) 
RULC ---  0.008 --- --- 
  (0.012)  
Kt-1 (10-3) -0.022 -0.022 0.069** -0.208* 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.032) (0.117) 
    
Adjusted R2 0.377 0.375 0.265 0.378 
No. Observations 473 473 93 252 
Fixed vs. random 
effects: 2(4) 
17.71 
(0.00) 
14.44 
(0.00) 
 1.82 
(0.77) 
24.83 
(0.00) 
Model Fixed effects Fixed effects Random 
effects 
Fixed effects 
    
 
Standard errors in parentheses.  Significant at *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% on a two-tailed t-test. 
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